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Abstract: Research on post-communist political economy has begun to focus on the interface between business 
and politics.  It is widely agreed that informal networks rather than business associations dominate this interface, but 
there has been very little systematic research in this area.  The literature tends to assume that a politicised economy 
entails business-political networks which are structured by parties.  Theoretically, this article distinguishes 
politicisation from party politicisation and argues that the two are unlikely to be found together in a post-communist 
context.  Empirically, this paper uses elite survey data and qualitative interviews to explore networks of 
businesspeople and politicians in Poland.  It finds substantial evidence against the popular idea that Polish 
politicians have business clienteles clearly separated from each other according to party loyalties.  Instead, it argues 
that these politicians and businesspeople are promiscuous.  Since there seems to be little that is unusual about the 
Polish case, this conclusion has theoretical, methodological, substantive and policy implications for other post-
communist countries.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the immediate post-communist years researchers were preoccupied with the speed with which 
the state and the economy should be separated from each other.  Most scholars operated under the 
assumption that the “grabbing hand” of the state was a threat to economic development (Shleifer 
& Vishny 1998).  More recently, it has been realised that politics and the economy cannot be kept 
completely separate from one another.  The great challenge is to establish an efficient interface 
between the two (Stark & Bruszt 1998; Olson 2000; Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann 2000).  In order 
to do so, it is necessary to understand the currently prevailing relationship between politics and 
business.  Most of the work on this subject deals with business associations.  In the Polish case 
(Jasiecki 1997; McMenamin 2002; Draus 2000), and elsewhere in Eastern Europe (Padgett 2000), 
the principal conclusion of the literature is that business associations are quite weak in 
comparison with informal networks. There is a tendency to conclude that political parties 
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structure these informal networks.   It is widely assumed that political parties maintain clienteles 
of businesspeople who have little or no relationship with other political parties (Frentzel-Zagórska 
2000: 225; Schoenman 2002a; Ágh 1998: 112).  Theoretically, this article argues that previous 
research ignores the possibility that parties and businesspeople have contrasting incentives.  
Exclusive relationships are in the interest of parties but businesspeople have an interest in 
maintaining good relationships with all parties.  Empirically, the paper finds that politicians have 
not managed to restrict the personal connections of senior businesspeople to one political party or 
bloc.  Most of the existing literature is based on informed speculation or a handful of case studies.  
This paper uses data from an elite survey conducted by the Institute of Political Studies of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences (ISP) and qualitative interviews conducted by the author to explore 
the nature of these informal networks.  The theory and methodology of this paper as well as its 
conclusions and policy implications apply to other post-communist states. 
 
The next section presents a theoretical critique of the party-politicisation hypothesis and argues 
that Poland is a relatively typical case with regard to hypotheses evaluated in the article.  The 
paper then goes on to present complementary quantitative and quantitative evidence on networks 
of businesspeople and politicians in Poland.  The conclusion emphasises the relevance of this 
research to other post-communist states, in terms of both academic research and the battle with 
corruption.   
 
Theoretical Context 
Firstly, this section defines the key concepts and hypotheses of the article.  It continues with a 
critique of the popular party politicisation hypothesis regarding post-communist business-political 
networks.  Finally, it assesses some key variables in Poland and elsewhere in the region, arguing 
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that the case for party politicisation is problematic and that there seems to be little that is 
distinctive in the Polish environment for business-political networks.  
 
Concepts and hypotheses 
Here, politicisation is defined as the ability of the state to directly influence the behaviour of 
individual enterprises.  In this sense, it is a feature of the state, not of networks.  This 
politicisation is a different, and more intense, type of state intervention than that which affects 
only general classes of enterprises.  There are two dimensions to post-communist politicisation: 
direct and indirect.  Direct politicisation refers to state ownership.  The influence of state 
ownership goes well beyond the category of traditional state-owned enterprises to encompass 
various ownership forms, including those in which the state has a substantial minority stake and 
ownership of firms by various parastatal bodies (OECD 1997: 65-67).  Indirect politicisation 
refers to a wide variety of devices which can give firms a vital competitive advantage, or, 
probably more often, shield them from competition.  These include derogations, licences, public 
procurement, quotas, etc.  (Staniszkis 1998; Drąg 1999: 62-69; Schoenman 2002b).  The 
commonplace observation that there is a high level of politicisation in post-communist economies 
underlies the executive hypothesis. 
 
The executive hypothesis simply states that politicians who have held positions in the executive 
are likely to have better connections with businesspeople than those who have not.  Moreover, 
politicians with executive experience are likely to know a different group of businesspeople than 
those who have never held high office.  The association between experience in senior executive 
positions and connections with businesspeople is likely to be especially strong in a highly 
politicised economy.   It is often assumed that the party politicisation hypothesis naturally follows 
from the executive hypothesis. 
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The party politicisation hypothesis states that both political and business leaders should have 
connections to a particular group of businesspeople loyal to, or dependent on, a particular political 
party.   Under party politicisation, phrases like “he’s an SLD man” tell us most of what we need 
to know about the political connections of a businessperson (Frentzel-Zagórska 2000: 225; 
Schoenman 2002a; Ágh 1998: 112).  This hypothesis does not contain any assumptions about the 
origin of such affiliations.  For example, they could be childhood friendships, communist-era 
connections or instrumental connections formed in the post-communist era.  The logic behind the 
party politicisation hypothesis is simple.  Given that parties control the executive and the 
executive controls a politicised economy, business-political networks should be structured by 
political parties.  That is to say, businesspeople and politicians are loyal to, or dependent on, 
political parties and their networks and do not cut across networks structured by political parties.  
The alternative to the party-politicisation hypothesis is the promiscuity hypothesis.  It predicts that 
networks of businesspeople and politicians will not be structured by political parties (Jasiecki 
2001: 158; Wasilewski 2000: 216).  Businesspeople form connections with politicians of different 
parties and politicians form connections with businesspeople who are also close to their political 
adversaries.  While the party politicisation and promiscuity hypotheses are alternatives to each 
other, both are consistent with the executive hypothesis, even though the executive hypothesis 
entails neither of them. 
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Critique of the party politicisation hypothesis 
The party politicisation hypothesis tends to assume that politicians and businesspeople have 
congruent interests.  The argument is as follows.  A high level of politicisation means that there 
are very strong incentives for firms to develop political connections and there are great 
opportunities for well-placed politicians to develop connections to the business class.  
Furthermore, the expense of electoral competition and the financial resources of business mean 
that there are very strong incentives for political parties to develop connections to the business 
class. However, this article argues that strong incentives for politicians and businesspeople to get 
to know each other and exchange resources does not necessarily mean that networks of 
businesspeople and politicians will be structured by parties. 
 
Businesspeople and political parties in capitalist democracies have conflicting interests.  Unless 
one party seems likely to stay in power for the foreseeable future loyalty to one particular party is 
not a sensible long- or medium-term option for any businessperson.  A Polish political lobbyist 
says:  
I do not think [that businesspeople are associated with political parties].  Not unambiguously in the sense of 
someone who is in business and is known to be associated with a political party.  What is much more common 
is someone who searches for contacts with politics … Since the government has changed every four years it 
makes no sense to declare unambiguously for one party.  Of course, they are going to try and arrange good 
relations with different politicians (Interview: Dziedzic, Warsaw, 1 July 2002).  
Of course, political parties have an interest in ensuring that businesspeople support only their 
party and do not, instead, or in addition, support their competitors.  The outcome then rides on the 
extent to which political parties can punish businesspeople who support other parties. The party 
politicisation hypothesis assumes that politicians can punish disloyal businesspeople while the 
promiscuity hypothesis assumes they cannot do so. 
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Just as the conflicting interests of business and parties arise from the uncertainties of the 
democratic process, so do serious limitations on the ability of parties to punish disloyal 
businesspeople.  When parties are out of government, they have little to offer businesspeople and 
are unlikely to be able to stop business seeking favours from their political opponents.  Even in 
government, it is questionable whether any party in a competitive environment would be in a 
position to turn down the support of a businessperson who had previously supported one of their 
political opponents. 
 
In assuming parties can punish business, the party politicisation hypothesis also seems to make 
cavalier assumptions about two other key features of the context of business-government 
relations: firstly, the extent to which the post-communist executive is entirely controlled by 
parties, and secondly, the relative importance of direct and indirect politicisation.   If the 
executive is not controlled by parties then businesspeople can focus on developing connections 
with individual ministers.  Financial benefits can be channelled to individuals who will then have 
no particular interest in punishing businesspeople for their disloyalty to a party.  Individual 
decision-makers become more important as the level of administrative discretion increases and 
the level of party discipline decreases.   
 
The party politicisation hypothesis is partially predicated upon an assumption that the importance 
of direct politicisation dwarfs that of indirect politicisation.  The membership of the boards of 
firms is transparent and the process of appointment is one which parties can relatively easily 
centralise and control.  New governing parties can bring about wholesale changes in the boards of 
firms in which the state is a shareholder.  Nevertheless, this control is dependent upon the 
importance of party government.  Appointments can easily be made by individual ministers from 
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their own personal clientele rather than from amongst party loyalists.  The mechanisms of indirect 
politicisation seem more difficult for parties to control.   Not only are they more complex, diverse 
and opaque than appointments, they are much more difficult to reverse.  Privatisations are an 
obvious example.   
 
This section has acknowledged that a high level of politicisation of the economy presents a great 
potential for party politicisation of business-political networks.  However, party politicisation is 
dependent on a series of intervening variables: turnover in government, party control over the 
government (which is in turn dependent on administrative discretion and party discipline) and the 
relative importance of direct and indirect politicisation.  The next section focuses on an 
assessment of these variables in East-Central European post-communist states, in general, and in 
Poland, in particular.  Before that is done, it is necessary to address the popular thesis that 
ideology is a vital factor in the structuring of business-political networks.   
 
Key variables in Post-Communist Europe and Poland 
In some party systems, like the USA and UK, parties have been traditionally identified as the 
“party of business” for ideological reasons and “right-wing” has automatically meant “pro-
business”.  However, in Poland, positions on secularism and liberalism versus religion and 
traditionalism are much more strongly associated with the classification of parties as left, right 
and centre than economic policy (see Figure 1). Another element of the Polish left-right scale is 
the genealogy of parties in relation to the previous regime.  The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 
claims a social-democratic identity but is more clearly defined by its secular, liberal attitude and 
its genesis in the United Workers’ (communist) party.  The right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action 
was a loose alliance that had little in common other than a vague traditionalism and a hatred of 
communism.  The centrist Freedom Union is a liberal party in the sense that it is pro-market and 
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secular.  It has its roots in the opposition to communism.  The last vital political player is the 
Peasant Party.  It is firmly linked to its peasant constituency, espouses moderately nationalist 
economics and has a background in both the communist regime and the anti-communist 
movement.  It is perceived as left of centre, in the Polish understanding of the left-right 
continuum.   
 
High levels of politicisation tend to override ideology as a factor in explaining links between 
parties and business.  A well-known example, and one which is often compared to East-Central 
Europe, is Italy (Jasiecki 2000).  In the era of Christian Democratic dominance, Italy was highly 
polarised on economic policy, but all parties, including the communists, had close connections to 
business because the high level of politicisation presented opportunities for both businesspeople 
and politicians which the competitive environment meant neither could pass up (Golden & Chang 
2001).  The rest of this section analyses variables which intervene between politicisation of the 
economy and party politicisation of business-political networks in an East-Central European 
context.  Poland seems to be broadly similar to its neighbours in respect of these variables. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
There is a notoriously high turnover at elections in East-Central Europe.  In Poland, no 
government has been re-elected (Lewis 2000: 62-67).  There is a consensus that individual 
decision-makers are allowed a huge amount of discretion in post-communist states.  Thus, party 
politicisation is faced with a context in which business and politicians have conflicting interests 
and it is therefore necessary to examine the extent to which parties can punish disloyal 
businesspeople. Substantial discretion is an accepted feature of post-communist administration.  
Comparative governance data shows Poland to be similar to most of its neighbours in this regard 
(World Bank 2003).  In Poland (Rzeczpospolita 2000b), and elsewhere, it is accepted that this 
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discretion provides great potential for individual decision-makers to privilege individual 
enterprises.   Moreover, it is doubtful whether post-communist parties are strong enough to 
control most of their ministers most of the time.  It is agreed that parties in this region are 
generally weak and undisciplined (Lewis 2000: 94-119) and once again Poland is no exception 
(Szczerbiak 2000).   
 
The enduring importance of state ownership, albeit in new forms, is a well-established theme of 
post-communist political economy.  If the Polish State is significantly different in this area it is 
because it has retained an even greater influence than many of its neighbours.  Schoenman’s data 
on board memberships shows the Polish economy to be subject to greater direct politicisation than 
supposed reform laggards Bulgaria and Romania (Schoenman 2002b).  Direct politicisation is 
assumed to work in favour of the party politicisation of business-political networks, since it is 
assumed that only party loyalists will be appointed to boards.  Of course, this takes for granted 
that appointments are made centrally by a party leadership rather than by loosely controlled 
ministers trying to promote their own personal clientele.  There is anecdotal evidence for both 
sorts of appointments in Poland, although most press coverage does tend to talk about party 
politicisation.  A good example is the controversial state insurance giant PZU (Rzeczpospolita 
2000a).  Survey evidence casts doubt on the link between appointments and party politicisation. 
The ISP survey described below found that over 90 per cent of senior businesspeople claimed to 
have never received a political nomination to a business position (Drąg 1999: 71). Even if this 
figure is exaggerated it seems unlikely to be totally misleading, since respondents had no problem 
volunteering sensitive information in response to other questions.  Finally, it is very obvious that 
much of the state’s influence, in Poland and elsewhere, is transmitted indirectly through licences, 
public procurement, tax breaks, grants, etc.  Although these mechanisms are well known, it is 
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much rarer for them to be presented as the basis of party-politicised networks of businesspeople 
and politicians.   
 
The two conclusions of this section are that the party-politicisation hypothesis is theoretically and 
empirically problematic and that there seems to be little that is unusual in the environment that 
surrounds business-political networks in Poland.  Therefore, the next sections directly investigate 
the structure of business-political networks in Poland, and the conclusion points out the 
implications of the Polish case for other post-communist states. 
 
Quantitative Evidence 
 
This section is organised as follows.   Firstly, a detailed account is given of the data used in the 
paper.  Secondly, regression analyses of this data are used to assess explanations for the 
variability in how well known the leaders are.  Thirdly, multi-dimensional scaling is used to 
assess the location of the leaders in the overall pattern of connections between business and 
politics.  Fourthly, cluster analyses are presented.  These serve the purpose of corroborating or 
questioning the statistical results from earlier sections. 
 
Data 
It should be noted at the outset that, although the data used in this section is excellent for 
investigating elite networks, it is not the sort of data which is used in the type of formal network 
analysis which is popular in sociology and of increasing importance in political science (Hughes, 
John & Sasse 2002; Knoke, Pappi, Broadbent & Tsujinaka 1996; Heinz, Laumann, Nelson & 
Salisbury 1993). In 1998 a wide-ranging elite survey was undertaken by ISP.  For the business 
section of the survey, 300 businesspeople were selected from the lists of the 500 biggest Polish 
firms published by Polityka (quality weekly) and Gazeta Bankowa (equivalent of the Financial 
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Times).  194 interviews were carried out making for a response rate of 64.6 per cent.  Since two 
members of some firms were interviewed there is data for 144 businesses.  In order to eliminate 
selection bias most of the following analysis is based on the firm.  Where there were two 
respondents from one firm, one of them has been randomly selected.  The survey contained 
questions about how well respondents knew 35 political and economic leaders.  The list of 35 was 
not drawn up systematically but seems representative of Poland’s most powerful people.  22 are 
politicians and 11 business figures.  One member of the list was a newspaper editor and another 
was the governor of the central bank.  The 35 leaders are listed in the appendices. 
 
Respondents were asked to rate how well they knew each of the thirty-five leaders.  Missing data 
on these items reduces the data set of firms to 135.  The survey contained five levels: knows very 
well, knows fairly well, has had contact with, knows the name, has never heard of.  For the 
present analysis the last two categories are conflated.  The last category is not very meaningful 
since the leaders are amongst the best-known people in the country.  In addition to being 
substantively problematic this category was not chosen very often by respondents.  On average 
only 5.3 per cent of respondents claimed not to have heard of the leader in question.  If one 
businessman (Sobolewski) who was not recognised by 64.1 per cent is removed the average falls 
to 3.43 per cent.  The analysis below is based on the assumption that interval-level data is being 
used.  Normally, five categories are assumed to be necessary for interval-level measurement.  
However, in the case of national elites the tiny difference between not having heard of someone 
and merely knowing their name, as opposed to levels of actual contact, seems a greater violation 
of the assumption of interval-level measurement.   This data is called “raw familiarity” in the 
analysis below.   
 
Raw familiarity is combined into an aggregate score which aims to measure how well the 
respondents know the individual leaders.  This is called “average familiarity” and it is simply the 
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mean raw familiarity score for any individual leader across the whole sample of 135 respondents.  
This score measures how many respondents know the leader, as well as how well they know him. 
Independent variables derived from the hypotheses outlined above were also measured.  The first 
of these assigns a left-right score to each leader on a scale of 0 to 10.  The politicians have been 
given the mean score for the supporters of their party from the Polish General Election Survey of 
1997.1  The business leaders have been randomly assigned a value from a normal distribution 
based on the mean and standard deviation scores from the ISP sample of business elite 
respondents.2  The various rumours surrounding the partisan identification or association of the 
business leaders were judged to be too unreliable or ambiguous.  For example, Andrzej 
Arendarski of the Polish Chamber of Commerce was a member of a right wing and centrist 
government in the early 1990s but is now often associated with the Democratic Left.  Decisions 
on the measurement of the left-right placement of the business leaders do not make a big enough 
difference to change the interpretation of statistical results.  Extreme left and extreme right 
positions were assigned to all business leaders without substantially changing the results of the 
regression analyses presented below.  The second variable aims at evaluating the executive 
hypothesis.  It is measured by the sum total of months for which the leaders have held cabinet 
posts, the presidency or the governorship of the central bank since the formation of the first non-
communist-led government in 1989 (European Journal of Political Research 1990-99; 
Rzeczpospolita). This measure is somewhat crude since junior ministers and heads of agencies 
would also have met many members of the business elite in the performance of their duties.  
Nonetheless, the measure clearly excludes those with merely party political and legislative 
experience who would have had little chance to directly influence enterprises.  The third 
independent variable simply distinguishes those who are primarily businesspeople from those 
who are not. 
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The definitions of the variables, together with summary statistics, are presented in Table 1.   
 
[Table 1 about here]  
 
 
What separates the well known from the not-so-well-known? 
 
The hypotheses about connections between politics and business contain two basic elements: 
firstly, how well known a leader is and, secondly, the location of a leader’s connections within the 
overall pattern of connections between politics and business.  This section deals with the first of 
these elements.  It does so by simply assessing to what extent key variables can explain how well 
known a given leader is.  This was done by means of a regression analysis, the results of which 
are presented in Table 2.   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The equation has a R² figure of over 0.35.  This means that the model can account for over 35 per 
cent of the variance in the dependent variables.  It, of course, also means that almost two-thirds of 
the variance is left unexplained.  The main conclusion of the analysis is that the executive variable 
is by far the best predictor of how well known the leaders are.  Also, the equation indicates a 
much weaker relationship between left-right placement and how well known the leaders are.  This 
supports the post-communist hypothesis since the more left wing a leader the better known he is 
likely to be.  The right-wing politicians, who are much less well known than other politicians, 
drive this relationship.  If they are excluded left-right placement is no longer statistically 
significant.  The isolation of the right wing is probably substantially a result of the timing of the 
survey.  In mid-1998 the right wing had just returned to power in the September 1997 election 
after four years without any parliamentary representation.  Therefore, it is no surprise that their 
connections with the business elite are shown to be weaker than those of the left-wing politicians 
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who had been in power for the previous four years.  This seriously attenuates the support the data 
gives to the post-communist hypothesis. 
 
The second element of the hypotheses is the location of a leader’s connections in the overall 
pattern of connections between business and politics.  Most simply put, this is about who knows 
the leaders.  A useful method for investigating this issue is multi-dimensional scaling. 
 
Multi-dimensional Scaling 
This ISP data can be used to calculate the social distance between the thirty-five leaders as 
measured by their connections with the wider business elite.  This was done in a number of 
stages.  First, a leader-by-businessperson matrix was constructed (35 leaders by 135 
businesspeople), whose cell entries contained the four levels of familiarity reported by each 
business representative for each leader.  Secondly, correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) were 
calculated for all pairs of leaders, with the 135 businesspeople as the number of cases.  The higher 
the correlation the greater the similarity between those two columns in the matrix.  This produced 
a 35 x 35 matrix.  Finally, the matrix was submitted to the ALSCAL (Alternating Least Squares) 
nonmetric Euclidean multidimensional scaling routine in the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences.  The purpose of this procedure is to try to represent the data in the correlation matrix by 
a simple geometrical model or picture. Data points close to each other represent individuals who 
are known and not known by the same businesspeople from the sample of one hundred and thirty 
five.  This is an exploratory technique and produces no model, or single equation, which sums up 
the data.   The number of dimensions in the final scaling solution was selected by identifying an 
”elbow” in a plot of the number of dimensions in a solution and the stress level, stress being a 
goodness-of-fit statistic.  After the elbow the rate of decrease in stress achieved by the addition of 
further dimensions itself decreases. The selected solution has four dimensions. 
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As an aid to interpretation, regression analyses were carried out using the scores on the scaling 
dimensions as dependent variables.  The results of regression analyses of all the independent 
variables upon each of the four dimensions from the scaling solution are presented in Table 3.  It 
is important to note that these regressions are being carried out on the results of a scaling solution, 
not on raw data.  This means that statistically significant results are not as substantively 
significant as they would be with raw data.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The most obvious characteristic of the multi-dimensional scaling solution is its lack of structure.  
Even with four dimensions the stress value is still only a “fair” 0.13.  Dimension 3 completely 
defies interpretation.  Dimensions 2 and 4 are both substantially unexplained by the variables.  
The highest scores on dimension two belong to better-known right-wingers and the highest scores 
on dimension four belong to better-known left-wingers.  This favours the party politicisation 
hypothesis.  However, again, this is largely driven by the isolation of the right wing.  The first 
dimension is the only one amenable to straightforward interpretation. Since average familiarity is 
unimportant it is a relatively pure measure of the location of individuals in the elite network.  It 
predicts a clearly separate location for business leaders.  This dwarfs the impact of the left-right 
effect on this dimension.  Once again, the left-right effect disappears when the right-wingers are 
left out.   
 
The lack of structure of the solution means that it favours the promiscuity hypothesis most of all.  
The importance of the contrast between business and political leaders also undermines the party 
politicisation hypothesis.  If this hypothesis were true, businesspeople would be associated with 
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political groups rather than forming a group of their own.  However, three of the dimensions have 
significant left-right effects.  This is driven by the right-wingers’ position.  The solution cannot 
distinguish between the business clienteles of leftist, centrist and peasant politicians.  It should not 
be forgotten that the isolation of the right wing is probably somewhat exaggerated by the timing 
of the survey.  In the next section a cluster analysis is employed with the aim of corroborating or 
questioning the results obtained so far.   
 
Cluster Analysis 
The cluster analysis performed in this section is also based on the correlation matrix described at 
the beginning of the previous section.  Cluster analysis attempts to classify the leaders with the 
most similar profiles of connections with the business elite into groups.  Single and complete 
linkage are the only methods suitable for a correlation matrix.  The ‘chaining’ effect of single 
linkage can underestimate the number of clusters in a dataset.  Therefore, complete linkage is the 
method of cluster analysis used here.  The dendrogram which identifies the exact membership of 
each cluster and allows the reader to assess the selection of the number of clusters is presented in 
the appendices.  In Table 4 an attempt is made to interpret the clusters by relating them to the 
independent variables used in the previous sections. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
The first cluster consists of five right-wing politicians, all with below average connections to the 
business class, three of whom have executive experience and two of whom do not.   This confirms 
the isolation of the right wing.  The second cluster consists of the 23 individuals, almost two-
thirds of the leaders.  In terms of connections with the businesspeople, 14 are above average and 
nine below average.  17 have executive experience and six do not.  Four are businesspeople, six 
are left-wingers, five are centrists, three are peasants, two are right wingers, one is the leader of 
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the Union of Labour party, four are businesspeople and the governor of the central bank and a 
newspaper editor are also included.  This large, politically diverse cluster confirms the lack of 
structure in the overall elite network and the weakness of the party politicisation hypothesis, 
beyond the isolation of the right-wingers.  The connections of the peasant, centrist and leftist 
politicians with the business class cannot be distinguished from each other.  This cluster is a 
confirmation of the promiscuity hypothesis.  The final two small clusters consist of 7 business 
leaders.  Five have below average connections with the overall business elite while two are above 
average.  None of the seven has executive experience.  This confirms the finding that some of the 
business leaders have clienteles that are separate from those of the politicians.  This is 
inconsistent with the party-politicisation hypothesis.  The fact that five business leaders have 
below average connections to other businesspeople is echoes the earlier finding that executive 
experience is a powerful predictor of who among the leaders is best known.  
 
The cluster analysis is fully consistent with the results of the other types of statistical analysis.   
Overall, the quantitative evidence tells a coherent story.  There is a marked lack of structure in the 
connections of the leaders to the business class which means that the data most strongly supports 
the promiscuity hypothesis. Party politicisation is only of importance because of the isolation of 
the majority of the right-wing politicians.  Some business leaders have clienteles amongst the 
wider business elite which are clearly separate from those of politicians.  These separate business 
leaders are partly distinguished by their relatively weak connections to other businesspeople in 
comparison to non-right-wing politicians: this is evidence for the executive hypothesis.  The 
survey is representative and this is a good reason to believe the story told by the quantitative data.  
However, the fact that lack of structure is the most salient feature of the analysis raises the 
possibility that the results simply reflect the limitations of the data or the statistical methods.  The 
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quantitative evidence for the promiscuity hypothesis is strong but it is only negative.  The next 
section presents positive evidence in favour of the promiscuity hypothesis.   
 
Qualitative Evidence 
The evidence presented in this section is based on thirty interviews carried out in Polish and 
English in 1999, 2000 and 2002.  Eighteen interviewees are senior representatives of what are 
generally regarded as Poland’s five most influential business associations (Jasiecki 1997: 177; 
Businessman July 1998: 69; Kozek 1999: 86; Dzwończyk & Sobczyk 1995: 153-154).  They 
come from the full range of backgrounds under the communist regime (opposition, old regime, 
émigré, private business, intelligentsia) and represent a wide range of sectors, excluding the 
special case of agriculture (state, private, privatised, small, large, sundown, sunrise, mining, 
manufacturing, services).  Eight politicians representing the main political options in the 1997-
2001 parliament and with a particular interest in business and business were also interviewed as 
were three professional political lobbyists and a trade unionist.  Thus, the sample is quite 
representative of Poland’s business and political elite. The interviews lasted forty-five minutes on 
average and were semi-structured.  In several of the interviews, respondents who had been asked 
questions relating to quite different topics volunteered evidence relating to the hypotheses in this 
paper. The fact that the evidence was volunteered increases its validity substantially.  As regards 
those who did not suggest the topic themselves, the discussion was begun with a straight question, 
“Are members of the Polish business elite associated with particular political parties?” 
 
All of the business representatives claimed to be “apolitical” but by this they meant they were not 
linked to any particular party, not that they had no connections with the political system.  In 
addition to refusing to identify themselves as linked to a party, business representatives struggled 
to identify most of their political and economic rivals as closely associated with one particular 
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party.  Respondents mentioned a variety of ways in which this non-partisan politicisation of the 
business elite was manifest.  Business leaders knew, and knew well, politicians from different 
political parties.  Several of them contributed funds, usually illicitly, to virtually the full range of 
parties.  Many of them had successfully lobbied opposing political parties for fairly specific 
benefits.  Success in big business, and success as a political leader of the business class, was 
associated with maintaining good relationships with a wide range of senior politicians.  The three 
political lobbyists backed up the views of the business representatives, often in the context of 
pointing out how the wide range of connections maintained by senior Polish businesspeople 
limited the potential development of professional lobbying in Poland.  Politicians again claimed 
that they and their parties had no particular clients in the business community.  However, some of 
them were eager to say that their political opponents had such clients, always citing recent 
corruption scandals.  It was widely acknowledged that a minority of businesspeople was 
genuinely associated with political parties.  These people had usually received nominations to the 
boards of commercial companies in which the state had a substantial or majority interest.  This is 
consistent with the well-established influence of direct politicisation in the Polish economy. 
 
Overall, the interview evidence favours the promiscuity hypothesis.  Support for this hypothesis 
was strongest from the business representatives and lobbyists.  Amongst the politicians there was 
a closer contest between the promiscuity and party-politicisation hypotheses.  If the positive 
evidence from the qualitative interviews is added to the negative evidence from the quantitative 
analysis this makes for a relatively firm confirmation of the promiscuity hypothesis.  The final  
section sums up and discusses of the wider implications of this research. 
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Conclusions 
This article is the first to bring a combination of high-quality quantitative and qualitative data to 
an investigation of the nature of networks between businesspeople and politicians in a post-
communist country.  It argues that Poland’s business elite is generally not as party politicised as is 
widely assumed.  If you come across a businessperson in the corridors of a ministry or the 
parliament you will probably not learn much by asking with which party she is affiliated.  There 
are two caveats to this conclusion.  Poland is party politicised in the sense that the right wing 
seems somewhat isolated from all the other political parties who seem to share a similar business 
clientele.  There is also evidence of party politicisation in the appointments to the boards of some 
firms. 
 
Neither does the enduring influence of the Polish State in the economy clearly structure 
connections between leaders and senior businesspeople.  However, executive experience does 
mean that leaders are likely to have better than average connections to the business elite.  This 
also means that many putative business leaders are not as well connected to the wider business 
elite as are senior politicians.   The main finding of both the statistical analyses of survey data and 
qualitative interviews is that there is a lack of general structure in networks of businesspeople and 
politicians in Poland.  Relations between businesspeople and politicians are not based on loyalty 
to political parties.  Instead, they are promiscuous.   
 
There is no obvious way in which Poland differs from other post-communist countries in its 
environment for business-political relations.  Thus, this research has methodological implications 
for studies of other post-communist countries and therefore also has implications for the 
understanding of business-government relations in those countries.  It is a warning that 
politicisation and party-politicisation are not the same thing and that inferring party politicisation 
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across the economy from prominent case studies may not be reliable.  The argument of this article 
has policy implications for the battle against corruption.  If party politicisation does not dominate 
the economy then reforming the regulations on party funding may not have the desired result.  If 
business-political connections are promiscuous it is necessary to either eliminate the multifarious 
ways in which the state can privilege particular enterprises or to make sure that such decisions are 
not in the hands of individuals or small groups. 
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Secular 
Libertarians 
“Left-Wing” 
Religious 
Authoritarians 
“Right-Wing” 
Market 
Liberalism 
“Centre” 
Social 
Protectionism 
Freedom 
Union 
Peasant 
Party 
Democratic  
Left Alliance 
Solidarity  
Electoral Action 
Note: This figure is based on a diagram representing an elite survey of parties in 1993 in Kitschelt, 
Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Tóka (1999: 233).  The 1997 parties are direct descendants of the 1993 
parties.  They are located in the spaces occupied by their organisational predecessors in 1993. 
 
Figure 1.  Political Parties in the 1997-2001 Polish Parliament 
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Table 1: Definition of variables and summary statistics 
Name Definition Minimum, Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Raw familiarity 1 for knows very well, 4 for has never 
met 1, 4 - - 
Average 
familiarity 
Familiarity score of average respondent 
for each leader 
3.19, 
3.96 3.64 0.2 
Business 1 if the leader is currently primarily a businessperson, 0 if not Dummy Variable 
Left-Right 0 for a leader identified with the far left, 10 for far right 2.2, 8.9 5.9 1.9 
Executive Number of months spent in a senior 
state post since 1989 0, 75 15.7 19.4 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regression Analysis of “How Well Known” Leaders are 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
Coefficient 
(standard error) Average Familiarity 
Intercept 3.599*** (0.109) 
Business -0.133* (0.068) 
Left-Right 0.02846* (0.015) 
Executive -0.00552*** (0.002) 
R² 0.353 
F 5.639*** 
Notes:  Model is Ordinary Least Squares. N=35.  
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
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Table 3: Regression Analysis of Scaling Solution 
Independent 
Variables Dependent Variables 
Coefficient 
(standard error) Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Dimension 3 Dimension 4 
Intercept -0.763 (2.615) 
-6.947** 
(3.262) 
3.801 
(3.878) 
7.818* 
(2.621) 
Average Familiarity 0.366 (0.716) 
1.672*** 
(0.894) 
-1.098 
(1.062) 
-2.653* 
(0.718) 
Business 2.122* (0.289) 
0.165 
(0.361) 
-0.174 
(0.429) 
0.493*** 
(0.29) 
Left-Right -0.226* (0.065) 
0.154*** 
(0.081) 
0.08162 
(0.096) 
0.255* 
(0.065) 
Executive 0.006197 (0.008) 
-0.006561 
(0.01) 
-0.01493 
(0.012) 
0.0109 
(0.08) 
R² 0.735 0.358 0.078 0.542 
F 20.81* 4.184* 0.636 8.872* 
Notes: Regression model is Ordinary Least Squares.  Dimensions from 4-dimensional scaling solution.  
N=35  * significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10% 
 
 
Table 4: Interpretation of Cluster Analysis 
Variables Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Clusters 3 & 4 
Above Average 
Familiarity All 5 below 14 above, 9 below 
2 above, 5 
below 
Senior State Experience 3 Yes, 2 No 17 Yes, 6 No 7 No 
Political affiliation & 
business activity All 5 Right-wingers 
6 Left-wingers, 
4 Businesspeople, 
5 Centrists, 8 others 
7 
Businesspeople 
Notes: Clustering method is complete linkage.  N=35.  The justification for joining clusters 3 and 4 
is that they are relatively small and join together at the next level of the hierarchical agglomerative 
process (see Dendrogram in Appendix). 
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Appendix: List of Leaders 
 
Arendarski, Andrzej Polish Chamber of Commerce 
Balcerowicz, Leszek Freedom Union 
Bielecki, Czesław Solidarity Electoral Action 
Bochniarz, Henryka Polish Business Roundtable 
Borowksi, Marek Democratic Left Alliance 
Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz Democratic Left Alliance 
Geremek, Bronisław Freedom Union 
Goryszewski, Henryk Peasant Party 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Hanna Polish Central Bank 
Gudzowaty, Aleksander Bartimpex 
Kaczmarek, Wiesław Democratic Left Alliance 
Kaczyński, Jarosław Solidarity Electoral Action 
Kluska, Roman Optimus 
Krzaklewski, Marian Solidarity Trade Union 
Kwaśniewski, Aleksander Democratic Left Alliance 
Lewandowski, Janusz Freedom Union 
Miazek, Ryszard Peasant Party 
Miller, Leszek Democratic Left Alliance 
Niemczycki, Zbigniew Curtis Group 
Olesiak, Kazimierz Bank Gospodarki śywnościej 
Paga, Lesław Warsaw Stock Exchange 
Pawłak, Waldemar Peasant Party 
Pol, Marek Union of Labour 
Rokita, Jan Maria Solidarity Electoral Action 
Siwiec, Marek Democratic Left Alliance 
Skowroński, Andrzej Elektrim 
Sobolewski, Zbigniew BIG Bank Gdański 
Solorz, Zygmunt Polsat 
Suchocka, Hanna Freedom Union 
Syryjczyk, Tadeusz Freedom Union 
Tomaszewski, Janusz Solidarity Electoral Action 
Walendziak, Wiesław Solidarity Electoral Action 
Wałęsa, Lech Christian Democracy of the Third Republic 
Wołek, Tomasz śycie Warszawy 
Zaraska, Witold Exbud 
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Appendix: Cluster Analysis 
 
 
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
 
  Leader’s       0         5        10        15        20        25 
    Name         +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  Pawlak           
  Suchocka            
  Pol                    
  Syryjczyk              
  Goryszewski             
  Wałęsa                       
  Olesiak                    
  Paga                    
  Gronkiewicz-W          
  Geremek                  
  Miazek                   
  Bielecki                         
  Kwaśniewski                          
  Siwiec                           
  Borowski                      
  Cimoszewicz                     
  Miller                            
  Balcerowicz                 
 
  Bochniarz                                                  
  Arendarski                                                
  Niemczycki                                             
  Kaczmarek                                                   
  Lewandowski                                              
  Kaczyński                                              
  Walendziak                                       
  Rokita                                                     
  Tomaszewski                                              
  Krzaklewski                                                 
  Kluska                                    
  Sobolewski                     
 
  Skowroński              
  Zaraksa                     
  Solorz              
  Wołek             
  Gudzowaty        
 
Figure 2: Dendrogram from Complete Linkage 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 Only one party tends to rate itself differently than do its supporters.  This is the Labour Union which is represented 
here by Marek Pol.  The Labour Union claims to be left of the Democratic Left while its supporters clearly rate it as 
well right of the Democratic Left.  Basically, the Labour Union holds to the classic Western European conception of 
the left-right continuum as defined by economic policy while its supporters conceive of the left-right continuum in a 
similar way to other Poles.  In terms of social distance, which is the dependent variable under examination, the 
Polish interpretation makes more sense (Szawiel 1999).   
2
 Two individuals do not fit comfortably into either the business or the political categories.  They are Hanna 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz, the Governor of the Polish Central Bank and Tomasz Wołek, the editor of śycie Warszawy 
newspaper.  They have been given the mean score for managers from the Polish Election survey.    
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